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AbstrAct
A political boundary divided the City of Shenzhen in 1978. The southern 
portion is designated as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), while the northern 
region remains a part of hinterland China. The divide creates a geographical 
and psychological chasm in the administrative and ontological existence of 
Shenzhen. The locals dubbed this border “the Second Line”.
The Second Line and SEZ were a part of Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s open 
and reform economic policies in 1978. The SEZs were designated areas 
along the southeast coast of China for the socialist state’s experimentation 
with global capitalism. After years of wars, revolution and repression of the 
individual pursuit of capital, Shenzhen underwent extraordinary urban and 
economic development, growing from clusters of villages holding 300 000 
residents to a megalopolis of more than a million in one decade.1
The Second Line drove uneven urban and economic growth in the Shenzhen 
SEZ. The radical speed of development and opportunities brought workers 
from rural areas of China. They made up the economic and urban substructure 
of the city, but were excluded from urban social welfare. Shenzhen’s industries 
rooted in instability and disposability of labour discouraged the settlement of 
the floating population.
The thesis proposal conceptually commemorates the site of the Second Line, 
and pays homage to its crucial role in the urban and economic formation of 
Shenzhen. At the urban scale, it acts as a public infrastructure, providing a 
framework for interface between the segregated territories of the city. The 
social housing component of the proposal is an architectural response and 
challenge to policies that allow for the migration of rural workers without 
provisions for everyday life. The proposal subverts the divisive ideology of 
the boundary through inhabitation, and creates a space of dwelling on the 
Second Line.
1 Lawrence Liauw, “’Leaping Forward, Getting Rich Gloriously, and Letting a Hundred 
Cities Bloom,’” in “New Urban China” Architectural Design vol 78 No 5 (2008): 6.
Figure 0.1 The Second Line as seen from Zhongshan Park
^
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After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, over half a century of warfare and political 
mobilization in modern China devastated the national economy.3 When Deng Xiaoping 
became Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, the state was in dire need 
of economic reform. One of Deng’s major policies was the instillation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) along the southeast coast of China to encourage foreign investment and trade as 
an experiment with the global free market. Shenzhen was the largest and most successful of 
the SEZs.4
In order to make the SEZ, the area of Bao’an was elevated to the status of Shenzhen 
municipality. The southern portion (closest to Hong Kong) was designated the new SEZ, 
while the northern portion made up the non-SEZ portion of the city. The site of the Shenzhen 
SEZ was strategically chosen for its geographic adjacency to Hong Kong, the international 
magalopolis that would act as a model to emulate for urban and economic expansion. The 
Second Line that divided Shenzhen in two and demarcated the boundary of the SEZ is named 
parallel to the First Line, which severed Hong Kong from China in its cession to Britain in 1842. 
The close combination of foreign capital and inland labour caused the birth and exponential 
growth of the new city, flattening the hilly landscape and constructing skyscrapers at record-
breaking speeds in the desire to be lifted out of perpetual poverty. Persistently exceeding the 
central government’s most optimistic projections for growth throughout its history, Shenzhen 
has become the poster child for the modern Chinese economic framework of “capitalism with 
socialist characteristics”.5 In 2010, the success of the Shenzhen SEZ encouraged the expansion 
of the Zone to include Shenzhen municipality in its entirety, causing the de facto annulment 
of the Second Line.6
Conceptually, the thesis intervention is situated on the former site of  the now virtual Second Line in 
memorialization of  its integral role in the urban and economic development of  Shenzhen.
The incredible speed of development left lines of urban and social disparity in its wake. This 
thesis argues that the continual success of Shenzhen through time, from its economic policies 
to its social stratification, from the historic development of modern China to the urban form 
of the city today, were necessarily dependent on a series of divisions at both macro and micro 
scales, in both physical and virtual forms. The Second Line is perceived to be the inaugurating 
macro apparatus of division. Its ideology is further perpetuated in micro segmentations of the 
city.
3 Peter Rowe and Seng Kuan, Architectural Encouters with Essence and Form in Modern China, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2002, 2-22.
4 Tao Yitao and Lu Zhiguo, ed., China’s Economic Zones: Design, Implementation and Impact, UK: Paths International 
Ltd, 2012, 1-20.
5 Kwan Yiu Wong, ed,. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China’s Experiment in Modernization, Hong 
Kong: Tai Dao Publishing Co., 1982, 3-7.
6 “Shenzhen SEZ to Increase in Area through the Removal of the Second Line; New Area to be Almost Twice 
that of Hong Kong (深圳特区拟撤关扩大 面积将接近两个香港,." Qilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报), May 
21, 2009. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-05-21/072315660067s.shtml.
"Submission of Shenzhen SEZ Plan of Expansion to the State Council; Unification of Regions Within and 
Without the Second Line (深圳特区延伸方案上报国务院 关内关外合一)," Last modified January 29, 
2013, http://www.szol.net/vip/article/2009-11-18/24040-1.htm.
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The urban fabric of Shenzhen is a collage of segregated territories. The three main typologies of 
the urban village (also known as Village-in-the-City or ViC), factory-dormitory compound, and 
new developments of gated communities are respectively tenured by demographic segments 
of indigenous farmers, the floating migrant population, and the nouveau riche. Urban form 
exacerbates the stratification of society, causing three distinct types of social reality to co-exist 
in Shenzhen in adjacent isolation.
The ground plane of  the thesis proposal acts as a public infrastructure, a framework to generate interface between 
the archipelagos of  self-contained territories. The unconventional interaction between various social classes seeks 
to leverage the characteristics of  each for reciprocal benefit.
Since Deng shifted the nation’s developmental focus to cities, large-scale urban development 
has drawn millions of rural workers to work in construction and light manufacturing industries. 
It is estimated that as much as 15% of the Chinese population are floating migrants.7 Although 
temporary work permits allowed transient populations to form the economic foundation of the 
city, the Household Registration system (hukou legislation of 1958) prevented their settlement 
in urban areas by denying state social welfare such as public healthcare, education, and right 
of residence. The situation is exacerbated in Shenzhen, where the economy was built on 
ubiquitous factories founded upon the instability of job security and disposability of labour.8 
While villagers had a hold on the land and investors on the economy, migrant workers were 
left out of both systems. They necessarily found residence in either transient dormitory barracks 
or in overcrowded urban villages.
The thesis intervention is an architectural response and challenge to existing policies that govern migration. By 
creating a space of  dwelling with relative permanence, the proposal carves a physical niche in the city for those 
responsible for its construction, and in doing so, impels policy changes for the allocation of  a place of  dwelling 
for the floating segment of  the population.
The twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 9 and new social housing objectives10 at both the 
national and municipal levels are beginning to address the vast economic disparities within 
Shenzhen and other boom cities. However, many policies only cater to a specific demographic 
segment, while the hukou system and deep social prejudices continue to propagate physical and 
psychological divisions within the Chinese population.11 The thesis proposal seeks to accelerate 
political reform through architectural intervention. Its goal is to subvert the divisive ideology 
of the Second Line through inhabitation, re-evaluate the relationship between urban and rural 
populations and the nature of their co-dependence, and create a secure space of dwelling to 
stabilize the precarious existence of migrants in the city.
7 Du Juan, “Shenzhen: Urban Myth of a New Chinese City,” Jornal of  Architectural Education 03 (2010): 65-66.
8 Pun Ngai, Made in China,  Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, (80-)83.
9 “Full Translation of the 12th Five-Year Plan,” Accessed June 2, 2013, http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/
upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf.
10  Du Juan, “2011 Shenzhen & Hong Kong Bi-City Biennale of Urbanism \ Architecture (2011 深圳 & 香港城市 
\ 建筑双城双年展: 10 Million Units: Housing an Affordable City (广厦千万 居者之城)," Architectural Journal 
(建筑学报) 3 (2012): 110-114.
11 Yukio Yamaguchi and Masumi Shinya, “Affordable Housing for Rural Migrant Workers in Urban China,” 
Nihon Fukushi University and Nanjing University: 2010.
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Years of internal warfare and revolution throughout the twentieth century caused Chinese 
technological advancement and industrialization to lag far behind the developed countries in 
the west. When Deng Xiaoping became Chairman in 1978 following the death of Mao Zedong 
in 1976, he sought to transform the State-Planned Economy to a Comprehensive Market 
Economy by encouraging private industries to create social wealth.  De-emphasizing ideologies 
instilled during the Mao era, Deng propagated the slogan “to get rich is glorious” to reform the 
Chinese economy. Implementing the new system of “capitalism with socialist characteristics”, 
Deng learned from the failure of past nation-wide movements (such as the Great Leap 
Forward), and propagated the mantra “let some areas get rich first”, testing economic theories 
and practices in small, contained areas. Successful trials could then be applied to the rest of 
the state, while unsuccessful models would be contained and not permitted to contaminate 
the national economy. Rather than to focus on inland China and agricultural practices like 
Mao, Deng designated a series of ports along the southeast coast of China. As these areas were 
neglected in earlier reforms, they were considered underdeveloped and “cultural deserts”. 
In the eyes of the central government, the agricultural fields of the newly designated Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) were the ideal tabula rasa landscapes for “getting one step ahead”.1
The SEZs were geographic areas that practiced a different set of economic policies from the 
rest of China. The special laws allowed and encouraged industrialization and international 
investment. The policy was so radically different from the suppressive, state-owned economy, 
that it unleashed a floodgate of economic activity in the SEZs. The SEZs were politically 
subjugate to their respective governing provinces, but reported economic activities directly to 
the central government for the sake of expediency.2
The duality of power in the city created opportunities for developers’ contention with the 
administration. Building and development permits within SEZs could be made with a civic 
focus to appeal to the provincial authority, or with economic rationale to persuade the central 
government. The lack of jurisdictional clarity in the dual system created consequential loopholes 
that would play an important role in the balance of legal and illegal development of Shenzhen.3
1 Mihai Craciun, “Ideology,” in Great Leap Forward: Projects on the City I, Köln: Taschen and Cambridge: Harvard 
Design School, 2001, 44-155.
2 Kwan Yiu Wong, ed., Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China’s Experiment in Modernization, Hong Kong: Tai Dao 
Publishing Co., 1982.
3 Ibid.
< Figure 1.3 Respective targeted areas of  Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s political reforms
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Up until the Qing Dynasty (ending in 1912), the site of modern Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
were a part of Bao’an County, which was largely made up of agricultural fields, fishing villages 
and small towns. The parcelling of the area began with the British cession of Hong Kong and 
the New Territories as a result of the Opium War in 1842 in the Treaty of Nanjing.4 The area 
flourished under a western paradigm to become an internationally renowned port city. During 
the years of political turmoil in China, many Chinese fled through Shenzhen to Hong Kong, 
creating ties of kinship across the bay, which would later facilitate crucial financial relationships 
that contributed to the economic success of Shenzhen.5
Bao’an County was an ideal location for the implementation of the largest SEZ due to its location 
in the Pearl River Delta and proximity to Hong Kong. The neighbouring city contributed 91% 
of foreign investment in the inaugurating years of the SEZ.6 Bao’an County was elevated to the 
status of Shenzhen Municipality in concurrency with the designation of the new Zone.
The Shenzhen SEZ is defined by the First Line of the Hong Kong border to the south, and 
a similarly impenetrable Second Frontier of China, or the Second Line, to the north. The 
significant difference between the First and Second Lines is that while the parcelling of Hong 
Kong was imposed on the Chinese nation by an external power, the division of the Shenzhen 
SEZ was enacted within China by its own political leaders in an experiment to artificially 
accelerate the development of the economy.
The Second Line cut through the municipality, defining the northern boundary of the SEZ. The 
initial development of Shenzhen was effectively linear, connecting the existing border town in 
Luohu District containing existing settlement to Shekou Peninsula, an industrial port owned by 
a private Hong Kong company. Shekou and Nantou Township nearby became the anchors 
of the new Nanshan District. The resulting region between the two nodes became Futian 
District, and the new centre of municipal administration. Luohu expanded into the commercial 
centre of Shenzhen, and Shekou Port redeveloped into a new social and commercial hub. 
The mountainous Yantian District to the east developed into container ports alongside beach 
resorts. The other two larger northern regions of Bao’an and Longgang were included within 
the municipality of Shenzhen, but excluded from the initial SEZ policy.
As a central effort, the SEZ policy mandated a team to be sent from every province of China to 
aid in the construction of Shenzhen, allowing for the expedient flattening of the hilly landscape 
of Bao’an county. The rapid urbanization and new records in the speed of construction coined 
the term “Shenzhen speed” as the apotheosis of China’s modern development.7
In an unwitting fulfillment of Deng’s notion of the “cultural desert,” Shenzhen deliberately 
ignored to the palimpsest of Chinese customs in favour of Western paradigms. The political 
mandates of the SEZ and Second Line directly shaped the planning and execution of urban 
and architectural form in the development of the city.
4 Peter Rowe and Seng Kuan, Architectural Encouters with Essence and Form in Modern China, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2002, 2-22.
5 He Huifeng, “Forgotten Stories of the Great Escape to Hong Kong,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1126786/forgotten-stories-huge-escape-hong-kong.
6 Kwan Yiu Wong, editor, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China’s Experiment in Modernization (Hong Kong: Tai Dao 
Publishing Co., 1982), 27.
7 Laurence Liauw, ed., “New Urban China,” Architectural Design vol 78 No 5 (2008).
< Figure 1.4 Four regions of  the Shenzhen SEZ
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t In the chapter “Micropolitics and Segmentarity” in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus, the authors describe three types of lines: the molar, the molecular, and lines of 
flight.1 The ‘molar’ refers to massive yet clear-defined assemblages such as the state apparatus, 
often referred to as the structured (arboreous), macro and territorialized. The ‘molecular’ refers 
to the micro practices of politics in the social sphere that often go unperceived, responses and 
behaviours of individuals that may accumulate to in emergent (rhizomic2) behaviour. Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that while concentrated power may appear to have significant impact on 
the populace, the greater source of influence lies in molecular administration, as the means 
of exerting power over the practice of everyday life.3 This dichotomy of dividing lines lends 
itself well to the development and structure of Shenzhen. While the molar apparatuses of 
the Second Line and the hukou are formally imposed on the region of the Shenzhen SEZ, 
they generate molecular fissures that infiltrate the physical, social, and economic growth 
of the city. Urban development rooted in efficiency has generated introverted enclaves of 
development, each with a specific architectural typology and a corresponding tenureship by 
a segment of society. The three main assemblages explored in this thesis are the urban village 
and indigenous farmers, the factory-dormitory compound and migrant workers, and newly 
developed gated communities and the ‘explosive rich’. Within these molar and molecular 
frameworks of division, Shenzhen’s unique agglomerations of geography and people, as well 
as their administrative and cultural identity, evolve and relate in unexpected ways to create 
emergent ‘lines of flight’.4 This third type of line subverts the segregation exerted by the 
first two types, and can be found the resourcefulness of Shenzhen’s indigenous and migrant 
inhabitants who leverage the conditions of the SEZ to productive and self-preserving ends.
The Second Line is a macro apparatus that concentrates the accumulation of capital within the 
Chinese state. Its physical boundary constrains large-scale urbanization and foreign investment 
to a limited geographic area. The result, after a long history of political and economic 
suppression, was an explosion of development within the Zone.
The macro policy of the SEZ was also the direct cause of a shift in land tenureship at a micro 
scale. Bao’an County was largely comprised of villages and farmland, a millennia-old practice 
that tied labour to property. When the fields were deterritorialized through expropriation 
and subsequently re-territorialized as urban development, the movement caused a rift in 
the assemblage of rural practice, thereby altering the function of the village by removing 
the territory of labour. The transformation of traditional villages into villages-in-the-city can 
be seen as a micro re-territorialization (from a place of dwelling to a proprietary source of 
monetary income), but also as a line of flight, durationally situated at the junction of the Mao 
and Deng eras of reform. By leveraging the combination of their rights of land ownership 
and the influx of migrants who do not have legal right of residence in the city, the indigenous 
farmers took creative advantage of the conditions imposed by the central government, and 
self-assimilated into the new urban society of production. In addition to becoming landlords, 
farmers have likewise taken a cue from the formal corporations situated in place of their fields. 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, “Micropolitics and Segmentarity,” in A Thousand Plateaus, translated by 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 208 - 231.
2 Tom Conley, “Micro” and “Molecular,” in The Deleuze Dictionary, edited by Adrian Parr, Edinburgh: Univer-
sity of Edinburgh, 2005, 175-178.
Christopher Alexander, “A City is Not a Tree,” Design n 206 (1966).
3 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of  Everyday Life, translated by Steven Rendall, Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press: 1988.
4 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, “Micropolitics and Segmentarity,” in A Thousand Plateaus, translated by 
Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 208 - 231.
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Villagers formed light industries of their own, magnifying traditional power relations within the 
village to that of a corporation, evolving to match the zeitgeist of production and partaking in 
the economic prosperity of the SEZ. 
The hukou system is a territorializing apparatus that segregates the Chinese population into 
an urban-rural dichotomy. Its purpose is to maintain the existing social structure of the state. 
However, the rapid urbanization of modern Chinese reform policies and subsequent labour 
demands saw the emergence of a double standard in policies that govern the inhabitation of 
cities. The allocation of temporary work permits draws migrants to enter and work in the SEZs. 
The economic opportunities presented in cities attract others to enter illegally still. While these 
migrant workers are permitted to form the sub-structure of Shenzhen’s successful economic 
model, their lack of urban hukou prevents their access to social welfare and amenities for 
living, as the state disengages itself from financial responsibility for the floating population. 
Dormitories within production compounds are made deliberately deplorable to discourage 
longevity of stay, while the migrants who rent units within overcrowded urban villages are 
without the ability to lay any claim to property. In this way, the SEZ polices draw rural peasants 
to cities in a deterritorialization of residence and labour reinforced by the hukou system. While 
integration into the production apparatus reterritorializes work, there is inadequate amenity 
for the provisions of dwelling. This creates a new demographic segment as a direct result of 
the SEZ economic reforms. Dubbed the floating population, the displaced workers do not 
fully conform to the legal description or lifestyles of the urban or rural dweller, but have 
rather developed their own distinctive characteristics as an informal conglomerate, with a new, 
complex division of formal and informal identities that divide the ontological and physical 
reality of the migrant.5
Conversely, the migration of young rural people to city factories can be seen as an unexpected 
opportunity. Social scientist Pun Ngai noted that while the labour of workers are exploited in 
the industry, the prospect provides an (albeit temporary) escape from the patriarchal system in 
rural China, generating emergent lines of flight in the urban-rural relationship of identity and 
territory.6
The final component of the micro territories of division is found the newly developed gated 
communities. As the Second Line reterritorialized capital within the SEZ, the economic 
incentives relocated dwelling spaces of those who operate and flourish within the new 
framework. In ivory towers elevated far above the city, the culturally rootless enclaves are 
ubiquitous the world over, and deterritorialize the identity of their inhabitants despite their 
physical solidity. They have more in common with the manifestation of global capitalism than 
the specific political and geographic topology of Shenzhen.
Both indigenous farmers of Shenzhen and the floating population have left their traditional 
practices to evolve with the development of the nation. The juxtaposition of their rural 
identities with the new urban environment has been pivotal in finding creative new niches 
with the changing economic climate, evolving to unprecedented emergences and complex 
assemblages.
5 “The Method of a Magazine.” Urban China 50 (2011).
6 Pun Ngai, Made in China, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, 49-76, as quoted in Adrian Blackwell, 
“Shenzhen: Topology of a Neoliberal City” in Shaping the City, 2nd Edition, edited by Rodolphe El--Khoury and 
Edward Robbins (London: Routledge, 2013, 287.
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n In 1978, Deng drew a line through Bao’an County, upgrading the region to the status of 
Shenzhen municipality, and designating an area within the first Special Economic Zone.7 The 
line Deng demarcated became the Shenzhen SEZ Administrative Line (深圳经济特区陆地
管理线), colloquially known as the Second Line (二线关). 8 
The Second Line carved through the city, beginning in Anle Village (安乐村) in Nantou 
District to the west and ending at Xiao Meisha Beach (小梅沙) on Beizaijiao (背仔角) 
Peninsula in Yantian District to the east.9 The four districts south of the Line (Nanshan, Futian, 
Luohu, and Yantian) situated adjacent to Hong Kong were designated the new SEZ, while the 
two larger districts to the north (Bao’an and Longgang) remained a part of hinterland China.
The Second Line was implemented in the early 1980s, and played a significant role in the 
urban, social and economic development of the Shenzhen SEZ. However, the disparity in 
administration, policies and practices between SEZ and non-SEZ Shenzhen became a point 
of contention with local residents and the municipality. The success of the SEZ caused the 
Zone to be expanded to include Bao’an and Longgang Districts in 2010, causing the de facto 
annulment of the Second Line10.
plAnnIng And ImplementAtIon
After Deng’s initial sketch of the Second Line in Beijing, the central government sent helicopters 
over Bao’an County to perform a series of three aerial surveys in order to determine the 
exact dimensions of the SEZ.11 The final account in late 1980 placed the area at 327.2 square 
kilometers (eventually increased to 396 square kilometers).12  A portion of the Second Line 
was implemented along the Wutong (梧桐山脉) and Yangtai (羊台山脉) mountain ranges13 
to take advantage of the natural barrier created by the difficulty in geographic elevation in 
order to dissuade illegal crossing. Major geographic features were retained for cultural or 
practice reasons, and became the sites for parks and recreation. 14
To prepare for the construction process, the engineering team surveyed the entire length 
of the Second Line on foot over a period of two-and-a-half days. They unexpectedly came 
across a number of existing villages that were located directly in the projected path of the 
Line. The central government’s abstract planning on a map, and the aerial overview surveys 
had neglected to take such fine grain development into consideration. Through a series of 
discussions with the residents, it became evident that it would be beneficial to the borderline 
villages to be included within the SEZ boundaries, as the policy would inflate their land prices, 
and make the inhabitants privy to the benefits of the SEZ. The administration negotiated with 
7 Mihai Craciun, “Ideology,” in Harvard Design School Project on the City: Great Leap Forward, ed. Chuihua Judy 
Chung et al. (Koln: Taschen, 2001), 133.
8 Tao Yitao and Lu Zhiguo, editors, China’s Economic Zones: Design, Implementation and Impact (UK: Paths Inter-
national Ltd. and China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2012), 1, 15.
9 Huang Weiwen, “Story of the Borderline (说界)," Urban China 24 (2007): 30. 
10 “Shenzhen SEZ to Increase in Area through the Removal of the Second Line; New Area to be Almost 
Twice that of Hong Kong (深圳特区拟撤关扩大 面积将接近两个香港)," Qilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报), 
May 21, 2009, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-05-21/072315660067s.shtml.
11 “How Did the Second Line Come to Be? (深圳二线关是怎么来的?)," last modified June 08, 2010, http://
jt.sz.bendibao.com/news/201068/210926.htm.
12 Huang , 2007, 30.
13 Ibid.
14 “How Did the Second Line Come to Be?”, 2010.
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the villages on a case-by-case basis, which resulted in the inclusion of some villages in the 
SEZ and excluding others. These border villages would later influence the construction of the 
Second Line, and contribute to the legal and illegal economies and practices of the Shenzhen 
SEZ.
physIcAl descrIptIon And AdmInIstrAtIve functIon 
The initial 126 kilometer-long Second Line was fully lit by streetlights and barred by a 2.8-meter 
high wire fence. Eight checkpoints were distributed over its length (later increased to fifteen). 
The Line was further supported by 24 minor checkpoints, 25 self-administered checkpoints for 
franchises situated along the Line, and 163 watchtowers dispersed across the 90.2 kilometer-
long patrolled cobblestone road. 15
The State Council approved the final plans for the Second Line in 1982, and construction 
began later the same year. The main body of the line and checkpoints were completed in 1983, 
and the supporting infrastructure and utilities were put in place in 1984. The Line became fully 
functional as an administrative apparatus in 1985.16 The final construction cost of the Second 
Line was 1.38 hundred million RMB.17
The administration of the Line fell to the jurisdiction of the Seventh Detachment of the 
Guangdong Province Border Police, a sector of the People’s Liberation Army (the national 
armed forces). Every citizen who passed into the SEZ was subject to inspection at a checkpoint 
and required to display a People’s Republic of China Boundary Region Pass (中华人民共
和国边境地区通行证) in addition to government-issued personal identification (身份证).18 
Obtaining an SEZ pass was often preceded by months of paperwork, which included the 
provision of proof of employment and political affiliation, invitation from within the SEZ, and 
monetary deposit.19 The administrative involvement in gaining access to SEZ was akin to that 
of entering another country. 
Checkpoints provided pedestrian access through a main administrative building and vehicular 
passage in adjacent booths set up across the roadway. The exact configuration of the restricted 
area of the checkpoint depended on the location and frequency of use. Infrastructure for the 
provision of utilities, including electricity, water, and communication devices, was constructed 
to support the entirety of Second Line and its checkpoints. Auxiliary facilities such as lodging 
and training grounds for the guards of the Seventh Detachment were also incorporated in the 
development of the Line.
The distance between the major checkpoints of the Second Line made life inconvenient for 
farmers whose villages were in close proximity to the boundary. In the construction of the Line, 
the residences and fields of a border village would often land on opposite sides of the fence. 
The long route to a checkpoint, compounded by long lines and wait times for processing and 
inspection, made the situation unviable for the productive practice of agriculture. In response, 
the administration placed a series of twenty-four farming passes (耕作口), colloquially known 
15 Huang, 2007, 30.
16 ““How Did the Second Line Come to Be?”, 2010.
17 Huang, 2007, 30.
18 Ou Ning, “Border Plan (边界计划)," last modified December 13, 2007, http://www.china-up.com/special/
wenhua/exhibit/pdf/边界计划.pdf.
19 Shen Ying, “Shenzhen Anniversary: Second Line,” last modified September 9, 2010, http://www.360doc.
com/content/10/0909/15/22953_52389176.shtml.
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as 'minor checkpoints', along the Line for easier access, and used in conjunction with specially 
issued agricultural passes.20
Between major and minor checkpoints, the Second Line was defined by a wire fence supported 
on concrete posts. A single guard occupied each watchtower and kept civilians away from a 
segment of the Line to prevent illegal passage.21
urbAn ImplIcAtIons
The existing nodes of development at Nantou market town and Buji railway station became 
ideal locations for the initial implementation of checkpoints. The construction of the Second 
Line and geographic restriction of development caused urbanization within the Zone to 
accelerate exponentially, breaking records with the speed of high-rise construction to the 
point where the Official Plan could not keep up with the pace of physical development.22 As 
entrepreneurs preferred to develop within the area of the SEZ due to the critical urban density 
and the economic incentives provided by the SEZ, a large discrepancy grew between the 
value of real estate inside and outside the Line.23 New roads and public transportation systems 
of the SEZ were aligned in the east-west direction in parallel with the Second Line. Highways 
leading out of the restricted zone necessarily passed through a checkpoint.24 
socIAl problemAtIc
The placement of the Second Line was planned from a macro administrative and geographic 
point of view. Consequentially, its location was somewhat arbitrary with regard to the micro 
political conditions on the ground. The imposed disparity of economic opportunity and 
development placed on Bao’an County became a cause for discontentment and concern for 
local residents. For example, the priority the SEZ placed on economic and industrial growth 
caused an inflation of employment opportunities within the Zone. However, the workers who 
were employed in the lower tiers of industry could not contend with such high land prices, 
and necessarily lived in non-SEZ Shenzhen where housing was affordable. For these workers 
and other commuters, crossing the Second Line was a daily occurrence. Many lower-middle 
class workers necessarily depended on public transportation to get to work and services. 
Throughout the life of the Second Line, drivers and passengers of buses were required to 
disembark at checkpoints, wait in line to be individually inspected and processed through 
a checkpoint, then re-embark on the other side. Crossing the border at least twice a day, 
particularly during rush hours, was a continual source of frustration for the local residents of 
Shenzhen.25
Further aspects of contention arose with the government’s task to apply two sets of laws to the 
same municipality. Different policies dictated the social and political practices of the SEZ and 
non-SEZ portions of Shenzhen and created inconsistencies in administration and permeated 
the Second Line’s ideology of division throughout the city. For example, fines for running 
20 “How Did the Second Line Come to Be?”, 2010.
21 Ibid.
22 Nancy Lin, “Architecture,” in Harvard Design School Project on the City: Great Leap Forward, ed. Chuihua Judy 
Chung et al. (Koln: Taschen, 2001), 165, 193-195, 211.
23 Ou Ning, “Shenzhen’s Flower Arrangement Lands and the Second Line (深圳插花地与二线关)," Ouning’s 
Blog, November 18, 2005, http://www.alternativearchive.com/ouning/article.asp?id=34.
24 Craciun, 2001, 119.
25 “Questioning the Shenzhen SEZ Second Line (质疑深圳特区'二线关')," China Reform (中国改革) 05 
(2002): 21-22. 
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a red light were significantly higher in the SEZ due to the density of the city and the more stringent 
enforcement. The taxi system was divided into red and green-painted cars. The “in-Zone” red cabs, 
equipped with drivers who had SEZ passes who mainly served the area inside the Second Line, though 
they were able to move across the border freely. The “out-Zone” green cabs could only service the 
non-SEZ part of Shenzhen, and were not allowed within the SEZ. The sparseness of development 
and longer traveling routes gave the green cab drivers a distinct disadvantage in the business.26 These 
administrative and de facto apparatuses of segregation would forge a deep social and psychological 
chasm in the population of Shenzhen.
flower ArrAngement lAnds / vIllAges
The exact location of the Second Line had always been a point of contention, leading to legally 
ambiguous practices by residents and developers situated immediately adjacent to the boundary. 
Landowners with property just outside the Line would develop their parcel, and offer border guards 
monetary incentive to “open a door” in the Line. If the negotiations were successful, the site would be 
effectively absorbed into the line, and gain an SEZ address. This would allow the landowner to reap 
the economic benefits and incentives of the SEZ, while maintaining a property with a low purchase 
value. 27 These practices constantly altered the specific geography of the Second Line, and its geometry 
on the ground would continue to evolve throughout its lifetime.
A significant phenomenon on the Second Line were Flower Arrangement Lands or Villages (插花
地/村). These were a particular incidence of the ubiquitous urban village. The Flower Arrangement 
Villages were situated on or near the Second Line. Their development would continue through the 
boundary, so that the Line would pass through or adjacent to a village. These settlements were named 
as a metaphor to slotting stems in a flower arrangement, an invading organism that pushed its way 
through the structure of the Second Line in a self-assimilation of property and inhabitation.28 Large 
clusters of such villages developed around Meilin and Buji Checkpoints, at the junction of the non-SEZ 
districts of Bao’an and Longgang, and the central SEZ regions of Futian and Luohu.29
These illegal developments originated from the lack of jurisdictional clarity, when the physical, 
constructed Line varied from the planned, political Line drawn on the map. As a result, the inhabitants 
of the discrepant spaces between the two iterations of the line were able to make an argument for 
refusing the governing power of either bordering district. This situation created a de facto no-man’s 
land (三不管) between the boundaries of the SEZ and non-SEZ districts of Shenzhen. The discrepancy 
in authority made it difficult for either district to administer the area. As a result, these lands were often 
left alone, and illegal development would be condoned through neglect.30
‘Illegal construction’ in this case denotes development that did not seek or gain official approval from 
the appropriate administrative body. The practice was not confined to flower arrangement villages, but 
was found throughout the urban villages of the SEZ. As the restriction against informal development 
was not strongly enforced by the administration during the growth phase of Shenzhen’s creation, the 
lack of governance facilitated the act of illegal construction. Perhaps its speed of urbanization allowed 
26  “Submission of Shenzhen SEZ Plan of Expansion to the State Council; Unification of Regions Within and Without 
the Second Line (深圳特区延伸方案上报国务院 关内关外合一)," last modified January 29, 2013, http://www.szol.
net/vip/article/2009-11-18/24040-1.htm.
27 Huang, 2007. 
28 Ibid.
29 “Luohu Takes Jurisdictional Responsibility of the Second Line; the End of Flower Arrangement No-Man’s Lands (罗
湖全权接管二线关 插花地三不管时代终结)," Southern Metropolitan Daily (南方都市报), October 8, 2003, http://www.
szlh.gov.cn/icatalog/a/2003/j08/a1187_587401.shtml.
30 Ibid.
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Shenzhen to be built as much by illegal activity as by legal construction and investment.31
consequences
While the non-jurisdictional nature of the Flower Arrangement Lands and other urban villages 
allowed for greater flexibility and scope of land use, they created difficulty in the lives of the 
villagers over time. 
The most significant negative factor in illegally developed areas was the lack of physical 
infrastructure, including electricity, water, and communications to support daily life. Although 
some utilities were illegally diverted from primary lines of resource in the municipality, the do-
it-yourself technologies lacked professional expertise and were often unreliable and unsafe.32
The informal developments also lacked supporting social infrastructure, particularly in 
agencies tied to the district level of administration. The illegal developments had no clear 
sense of being within the jurisdiction of any district. As a result, the administrative bodies 
would often refuse responsibility, leaving the residents orphaned of governance. The villagers 
would have no place to obtain legal titles (such as the certification of marriage or death) or 
the right to a hospital. As these villages did not fall into a policing precinct, there was no place 
to report crimes. They were also excluded from surrounding school districts. Parents in the 
villages were often forced to send their only children to unregistered, “black” schools that 
would likely fail to meet regularized standards of public schools in China.33
AdmInIstrAtIve InterventIon
In 2003-2004, the municipal government of Shenzhen officially addressed the issue of 
Flower Arrangement Villages as a “blind spot” or “black hole” in the administrative system. 
Unauthorized diversion of infrastructural systems of electricity, water, and communications 
was also cited to be problematic. More specifically, the government pointed to the structural 
inadequacy of the illegal residences. As most of the buildings were constructed without permit 
or standardization, they did not necessarily adhere to the appropriate building codes, nor 
were they subject to processes of inspection and quality control. The often hilly terrain where 
the villages were situated put the residences in danger of structural failure.34 Accumulation 
of inadequate foundations, along with sub-standard construction methods and materials 
compounded over years of weathering, caused the houses to be in a state of near collapse. 
Incidents involving buildings slipping down the steep topography were held up as examples 
by the government. In particular, a case in 2004 that killed two people was cited to spur on 
the urgency of the movement.35 In September of 2004, the municipal administration initiated 
a movement to ‘thoroughly clean-up’ of the Flower Arrangement Villages. In particular, the 
jurisdiction of illegal border developments between Luohu and non-SEZ Shenzhen were 
assigned to Luohu District. The Luohu government would necessarily take responsibility for 
the quality of life and lawfulness in all aspects of social and physical support in the neglected 
developments. A part of the initiative included the overall assessment of schools in the area. 
31 Craciun, 2001, 121.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34  Many illegal practices described can be applied to urban villages at large; conditions such as hilly terrain and 
lack of district jurisdiction is specific to flower arrangement villages.
35 Jin Yong, “Shenzhen Second Line Flower Arrangement Villages to Implement ‘Evacuation Movement’ 
Immediately (深圳“二线”插花地 实施“空楼行动”刻不容缓)," Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily (
深圳特区报), September 6, 2004, http://sz.focus.cn/news/2004-09-06/76047.html.
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Those which were below standard would be shut down and its students dispersed to 
surrounding public schools.36
The procedure set out by the municipal government included the complete evacuation 
and demolition of the illegal structures, investigation of past mistakes of jurisdictional 
neglect and implementation of appropriate disciplinary actions, increase of management, 
encouragement of adherence to new laws, and increased cooperation between all parties 
involved in the administration of the villages.37
declIne of the lIne
The inconveniences of daily life as well as the formal and de facto divisions of Shenzhen 
have caused contention against the Second Line almost since the day of its inauguration. 
Its administrative significance and jurisdictional severity had continued to decline over the 
years to the point where the checkpoints were practically ineffectual by the year 2005.38 
However, a number of issues kept the administration from the official annulment of the 
Second Line.
At the conception of the Second Line, the administration predicted that the system would be 
effective in preventing crime within the SEZ. As every person who entered the Zone would 
be accounted for, it was believed that known criminals would not be able cross the border. 
The actual effectiveness of this optimistic forecast remains unproven.39
A second point of contention lay in the livelihoods of the border guards of the Seventh 
Detachment. They had been devoted to administering and patrolling the Second Line for 
the past few decades, and would lose their jobs upon its eradication.40
Amidst the accumulation of protests and complaints from the inhabitants of Shenzhen, the 
issue of the possible annulment of the Second Line was first officially brought up by the 
administration in 1998 in the “Two Sessions” (两会) meeting of Shenzhen. It raised the 
problematic issue of the "one city, two policies" nature of Shenzhen's governance. The 
Second Line was criticized to have divided the city and prevented its holistic development. 
Shenzhen could not move forward from the SEZ period toward further urban and economic 
expansion as a disjunct entity. The discussion led to the State Council's survey of Shenzhen 
in June of 2000. The investigation concluded that the Second Line did not hinder the 
economic and urban development of Shenzhen.
The conflict reached a climax in the national "Two Sessions" meeting of 2003. Major issues 
of note included the traffic congestion at the busy passageways of Nantou, Tongle, Meilin 
and Buji, as the checkpoint system was the only method of access between SEZ and non-SEZ 
areas. The problem was expected to be resolved if the checkpoints and the time-consuming 
inspection process were eliminated. The management and upkeep of the Second Line also 
36 Luohu, 2003.
37 Feng Yiju, “Shenzhen Municipality to Thoroughly Clear Illegal Construction in ‘Second Line’ Flower 
Arrangement Lands (深圳市全面清理“二线”插花地违法建筑)," Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily (
深圳特区报), September 2, 2004, http://www.southcn.com/news/dishi/shenzhen/shizheng/200409020325.
htm.
38 Ou, 2005.
39 Huang Weiwen, in conversation with the author, 2012.
40 Ibid.
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cost tens of millions of RBM every year. As Shenzhen was politically subjugate to Guangdong 
province but economically tied to Beijing, the cost of operation had a negative impact on the 
national budget. The matter was once again put to rest in January 2008, when the State Council 
concluded that the Second Line would not be annulled before the next General Election of 
Hong Kong in 2017, thereby keeping the Line in place for at least another decade.41
However, the issue of the Second Line quickly re-surfaced in the 2009 review of the Shenzhen 
Comprehensive Reform Experimental Plan (圳综合配套改革试验方案). The review 
indicated that the existence of the Line affected the "scope, land, and financial situation of 
Shenzhen", with each item pending further investigation.42 In Shenzhen’s transition from an 
SEZ of China to an international megalopolis, the lag in speed of urbanization outside the 
Zone made Shenzhen less competitive as a coherent municipality on both the national and 
international level.43
The decision to officially annul the Second Line was approved as a part of the 2009 Reform 
Plan. This plan resolved to put an end to the ‘one city, two policies’ conflict, and restored 
Shenzhen’s sense of cohesion as a city. The formerly non-SEZ districts of Bao’an and Longgang 
became incorporated into the SEZ in 2010. The effort added 1,553 square kilometres to 
the existing 395 square kilometres of the original SEZ, forming a total area of 1 948 square 
kilometres, or nearly twice that of Hong Kong and the New Territories (at a combined 1 103 
square kilometres).44
The geographic boundaries of SEZ policy was moved to the northern boundary of Shenzhen, 
between Bao’an and Longgang Districts (now a part of the SEZ), and the bordering cities of 
Dongguan and Huizhou.45
Practical questions remain with respect to the treatment of the former site of the Second Line. 
For the time being, much of infrastructure of the checkpoints and fences remain. The urban 
and social problems caused by the Line, including of issues of traffic congestion, disparities 
between the two parts of Shenzhen on either side of the Line, and Flower Arranging Lands 
are beginning to be addressed, and may only be resolved over time.
41 “Shenzhen SEZ to Increase in Area through the Removal of the Second Line; New Area to be Almost 
Twice that of Hong Kong (深圳特区拟撤关扩大 面积将接近两个香港)," Qilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报), 
May 21, 2009, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-05-21/072315660067s.shtml.
42 Ibid.
43 Ou, 2005.
44 Shenzhen, 2009.
45 Ibid.
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Checkpoints were the main means of entering and exiting the SEZ. They provided both 
pedestrian access through the main administrative building, as well as vehicular passage in 
adjacent booths set up across the roadway. The exact configuration of the restricted area of the 
checkpoint depended on traffic frequency and specific location. Utility infrastructure, including 
electricity, water, and communication devices, was constructed to support the entirety of 
Second Line and its checkpoints. Auxiliary facilities such as training and lodging grounds 
for the guards of the Seventh Detachment were also within the scope of the development of 
the Line. The guards patrolled the fences adjacent to checkpoints closely in order to prevent 
civilians from approaching the vicinity of the boundary and to discourage illegal crossing.46
The original eight checkpoints include Nantou (南头), Tongle (同乐), Baimang (白芒), Meilin 
(梅林), Buji (布吉), Shawan (沙湾), Yantian (盐田),  and Beizaijiao (背仔角).
The distance between the major checkpoints of the Second Line made life inconvenient for 
farmers whose villages were adjacent to the boundary. In the construction of the Line, it often 
happened that residences and fields of a border village would be divided by the impassable 
wire fence. Two or three soldiers would inhabit each minor checkpoint to regulate the flow 
of people. The relative frequent occurrence of minor checkpoints alleviated congestion and 
unnecessary waits times in the daily routine of the indigenous farmers.47
The following pages survey the abandoned infrastructure and re-appropriation of the former 
apparatus of administration after the Second Line was annulled in 2010. The impressions also 
serve to provide context to areas adjacent to the restricted Second Line and components of the 
collage city that resulted from the fusing of formerly separated districts. The creative leveraging 
of land under indeterminate jurisdiction serves as informal precedents to the design proposal.
46 Huang, 2007, 28-35.
47 “How Did the Second Line Come to Be?”, 2010.
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nAntou checkpoInt
Nantou checkpoint is located near Nantou 
market town. Prior to the implementation of 
the SEZ, the walled town was the commercial, 
economical, and political centre of Bao’an 
County. This west-most checkpoint was one of 
the first to be constructed due to the existing 
settlement and critical density of development.
Two of the major traffic arteries of the city, 
Shennan Dadao and Beihuan Dadao, feed into 
Nantou checkpoint, while Zhongshan Park lies 
just inside the Line. Like all other checkpoints, 
commuters on the public transit system were 
required to disembark the vehicle at the Line, 
be administered through the checkpoint, and 
board another bus on the other side, causing 
local protests against the inconvenience brought 
on by the Second Line. The Nantou checkpoint 
administers passage from Bao’an District 
(non-SEZ) into Nanshan (SEZ), and connects 
Shenzhen SEZ to Dongguan and Guangzhou. 
Today, the checkpoint is the centre of a 
transportation hub. Highway and walkway 
bridges swirl in front of the main administrative 
building, which continues as a bus terminal. The 
offices on the second floor are now used mainly 
for storage, while the ground floor has been 
taken over by shops.
Beihuan Dadao has been constructed parallel to 
the former site at Nantou. Remnants of the Line 
are evident around the checkpoint. 
An earth mound marks the former location of 
the line, and steps built into the side of the hill 
provide easy access. Migrants have co-opted 
the land around the Line due to its lack of 
clear jurisdiction in tenureship and created a 
linear shantytown made of found objects. The 
inhabitants collect and sort through garbage for 
useful material, finding a labour niche for the 
former rural dwellers seeking a new, prosperous 
life in the city.
Nantou Market Town
Nantou Checkpoint Opening 
Ceremony 1982
Nantou Checkpoint in Use 2005
Nantou Checkpoint Abandoned 
2012
Mound marking the former Second 
Line with carved steps for ease 
of access
Linear shantytown re-appropriation of 
former site of the Second Line
Shantytown residents at work sorting 
garbage
Opposite
32
33
34
35
^
^
--
南头检查站Figures 2.2.1.1-8 Impressions of  Nantou Checkpoint
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tongle checkpoInt
Due to the high urban density and level of traffic 
in the western region of the Shenzhen SEZ, 
Tongle Checkpoint is situated only about 2.5 
kilometres down the street from Nantou. The 
checkpoint is named after the adjacent Tongle 
urban village and connects Bao’an and Nanshan 
Districts. It is the main access point from the SEZ 
to Bao’an International Airport and Guangzhou 
via the Guang-Shen Expressway.
As the location of the Second Line was made 
along a mountain ridge, Tongle is situated north 
(rather than east) of Nantou. It is located in the 
outskirts of urban development, and situated 
parallel to a hydro line. Despite the electrical 
towers (or perhaps because of them, making the 
area undesirable for commercial development), 
farmers have appropriated a linear swath of land 
into makeshift homes. There is no mound here 
to mark the line, thus allowing for agricultural 
patches for each house as a means of livelihood. 
Opposite the dirt road that provides access to the 
shacks, intense construction is underway for a 
new high-tech park. 
The checkpoint itself is oriented towards vehicular 
travel, and the main building is preceded by 
a large traffic plaza. The traffic island once 
occupied by guards is now a convenience shop 
in a cart.
Opposite
38-39
39
40-41
42-43
Farmer dwellings under hydro towers 
along the former site of the 
Second Line
Tongle Checkpoint 2012
Temporary construction workers’ 
barracks adjacent new high-
tech park development
Agricultural re-appropriation adjacent 
fence marking the former site 
of the Second Line
Juxtaposition of architectural typologies 
in the city
同乐检查站Figures 2.2.2.1-6 Impressions of  Tongle Checkpoint
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45
Baimang is situated further north than any other 
point in the Line. It is the eastmost checkpoint 
that provides access from Bao’an into Nanshan, 
and is connects the SEZ to Shiyan and Gongming 
townships in Bao’an District.
Baimang is also named after the adjacent urban 
village. A large traffic circle sits at the end of 
the cul-de-sac style street from within the zone 
that leads to the site, and a traffic island acts 
as makeshift waiting area for yet another bus 
terminal at the checkpoint. The former main 
building has been divided up into retail units 
according to its architectural bays, two of which 
are currently occupied.
Opposite
46-47
47
Baimang Village-in-the-City main gate
Newly developed area of Baimang 
Village-in-the-City
Handshake building adjacent in old 
Baimang Village-in-the-City
bAImAng checkpoInt
白芒检查站Figures 2.2.3.1-4 Impressions of  Baimang Checkpoint
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meIlIn checkpoInt
Baimang is situated further north than any other 
point in the Line. It is the eastmost checkpoint 
that provides access from Bao’an into Nanshan, 
and is connects the SEZ to Shiyan and Gongming 
townships in Bao’an District.
Baimang is also named after the adjacent urban 
village. A large traffic circle sits at the end of 
the cul-de-sac style street from within the zone 
that leads to the site, and a traffic island acts 
as makeshift waiting area for yet another bus 
terminal at the checkpoint. The former main 
building has been divided up into retail units 
according to its architectural bays, two of which 
are currently occupied.
Meilin allows passage from Bao’an into Futian, 
the region of the political Shenzhen city centre. 
The checkpoint marks the beginning of the 
Mei-Guan Expressway, and leads to Dongguan, 
Tangxia, and Fenggang, as well as the townships 
Longhua and Bantian in Bao’an.
The Meilin urban village has expanded into 
three distinct developments, which are situated 
along the east-west running Meilin road within 
the Zone, about three kilometers south of the 
checkpoint. First Meilin Village is an example 
of a well-to-do village corporation, who had the 
monetary to develop from the ViC model into 
a gated community filled with new, brick-clad 
apartment buildings. Shuttle buses run from the 
village to Wal-Mart and other large chain stores. 
The Second and Third Meilin villages are less 
prosperous, but have also transformed from the 
usual village typology to concrete slab apartment 
residences.
An anomaly of the checkpoint as of April of 
2012 is that it still appears to be in use. The main 
building is still occupied by guards who inspect 
identification of those who pass from outside the 
Zone. However, around the perimeter of the 
building, one side is fenced off and inaccessible, 
but the other merely holds a warning sign, and 
pedestrians walk freely around the side of the 
checkpoint. Convenience stores and fast food 
vendors have opened shop along this facade 
of the building, flagrantly acknowledging the 
passage.
Like the other checkpoints, bus terminals are 
situated on either side of the building.
Opposite
51
52
53
Developed Condos of First Meilin 
Village-in-theCity
Meilin Checkpoint
Accessible side of main building lined 
with food vendors
Prohibited side of Checkpoint building
Visitors passing through the Checkpoint
Street fruit vendor in Third Meilin 
Village-in-the-City
Young resident of First Meilin Village-
in-the-City
<
 >
<
 >
梅林检查站Figures 2.2.4.1-8 Impressions of  Meilin Checkpoint
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bujI checkpoInt
Buji checkpoint allows access to eastern 
parts of Guangdong, such as Huizhou and 
Chaoshanmeizhou, as well as Fujian province.
The area was traditionally the main transportation 
node of Bao’an County. The rail station at Buji 
connected the agricultural region to Hong Kong 
to the south, and Guangzhou to the north. 
Today, its infrastructure network includes the 
Shen-Hui Expressway, Caopu Metro Station on 
the Longgang Line, and Buji Checkpoint of the 
Second Line, in addition to the train. Both Buji 
Metro Station and Township are located north of 
the checkpoint.
Given this nexus of flows, it is no wonder that 
the checkpoint at Buji had the highest flow of 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic of all Second 
Line Checkpoints during its use. The wide 
Shen-Hui Expressway with its ten drive-through 
checkpoint booths runs parallel to the rail and 
the elevated metro, placing great emphasis on 
motorized travel. Buji is the only checkpoint 
where the main administrative building is split on 
either side of the street, each with its own bus 
terminal, respectively to travel within and without 
the Line. A skywalk connects the two checkpoints 
and Caopu Metro Station.
Today, the administrative buildings remain open 
in the form of shops and public washrooms. 
The intensity of infrastructural development has 
traditionally increased the settlement density at 
Buji. The area is notorious for its “sticking flower” 
lands and villages that transverse the Second 
Line, blurring the exact location of the boundary.
Opposite
56-57
58-59
Elevated Caopu Metro Station
Buji Checkpoint 2012
Urban village development in Buji 
Precinct
布吉检查站Figures 2.2.5.1-4 Impressions of  Buji Checkpoint
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shAwAn checkpoInt
Shawan Checkpoint is situated between 
Longgang and Luohu districts and adjacent to 
Shenzhen Reservoir. It allows access to eastern 
parts of Guangdong such as Huizhou. The 
checkpoint mainly directs traffic of small vehicles 
and is a terminal for both local and long-distance 
buses. 
The building is situated with traffic plazas on 
either side (dealing with in-Zone and out-Zone 
traffic, respectively) and allows open access to 
passers-by. The upper offices and units on the 
ground floor are leased out as storage areas for 
fashion vendors. A room on the lower floor acts 
as an office and ticket kiosk for long-distance bus 
companies. A recreational basketball court is 
installed in a portion of the building.
Opposite
62
62-63
Utilities at Shawan Checkpoint
Long-distance bus ticket vendor and 
administrative office
Shawan Checkpoint in the evening
沙湾检查站Figures 2.2.6.1-4 Impressions of  Shawan Checkpoint
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yAntIAn checkpoInt
Yantian Checkpoint is located in close proximity 
to the railway and industrial land use. This 
checkpoint leads to eastern regions of Guangdong, 
such as Huizhou and Chaoshanmeizhou. It 
is named after Yantian district, and allows 
access between Longgang and the SEZ. Due 
to the mountainous topography, the latter two 
checkpoints are less frequented than the others. 
Yantian district is known for its industrial 
container ports and beachside resorts.
Opposite
66-67
Elevated expressways of Yantian
Yantian container port
盐田检查站Figures 2.2.7.1-3 Impressions of  Yantian Checkpoint
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beIzAIjIAo checkpoInt
Beizaijiao is situated on Shenzhen’s eastern 
shoreline between Longgang and Yantian 
districts. It allows access to Nanou township and 
Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant.
The checkpoint is named after the undulating 
scenic peninsula it is located on, and is known 
for its beach  resort and recreational facilities.
Opposite
70-71
Recreation amenities at Beizaijiao 
Peninsula
Beizaijiao Checkpoint
背仔角检查站Figures 2.2.8.1-3 Impressions of  Beizaijiao Checkpoint
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mIcro terrItorIes of segregAtIon
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< Figure 2.3.1 Urban Villages: Orthographic and Isometric Drawings
The household registration system was created in 1958. The policy, known as the hukou (户口), 
classified Chinese citizens as either rural or urban dwellers and associated them with specific 
geographic locations. This conservative apparatus of administration effectively tied people to 
territory, acted as an intra-state passport system to control migration, allowed for the ease of 
census and facilitated the implementation of nation-wide mobilizations. The two types of hukou 
were each associated with a different set of rights and policies, effectively creating two classes 
of citizens.48  
One of the main differences in the administration of rural and urban hukou lay in land tenure. 
Urban dwellers had full access to social welfare and benefits, but had no permanent right to 
land, which remained property of the state. When property is purchased by an individual, it 
is in effect a lease of use rights for a period of 70 years, upon the termination of which the 
land is returned or re-leased (re-purchased).49 Rural dwellers lived in clustered villages within 
walking distance to one another, and were allowed use rights to land beyond their residences 
for farming. However, rural dwellers were excluded from social security, and had no right to 
access urban facilities such as public education and healthcare. Due to sparse development 
and geographic distance from the central and municipal seats of power, state policies were 
somewhat less stringently enforced in rural areas.50
In the villages of Shenzhen prior to the implementation of the SEZ (then Bao’an County), the 
population of each village was made up of members of the same family and shared the same 
last name. New dwellings were built as male children married, while female children moved 
to the villages of their husbands.51
At the implementation the SEZ in 1978, the government negotiated with indigenous inhabitants 
and allowed them to keep the land on which they dwelled in exchange for the seizure of their 
agricultural fields for urbanization. 52 The village would have collective use rights to the site, 
and each male member was allocated a piece of property of approximately ten by ten metres 
for inhabitation.53
Having been deprived of their livelihoods, villagers creatively leveraged the influx of migrant 
population who had come to take part in the economic boom, but lacked public housing 
provisions. The farmers extruded their formerly single-story houses to small apartment 
buildings. These new developments, known as Villages-in-the-City (城中村, abbreviated as 
ViC) or urban villages, often range from three to seven stories tall, depending on the financial 
situation of the village and the individual farmer, and are self-constructed using available 
materials and technologies. The original owners of the house would often take a unit in the 
building, and rent the remaining spaces to migrant workers.54 In this way, the farmers of 
48 Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 7.
49  Yushi Uehara, “Unknown Urbanity: Towards the Village in the City,” in “New Urban China,” edited by 
Laurence Liauw, Architectural Design, vol 78 no 5 (2008), 52-55.
50  Ibid. Dong Guoli, “Pseudo-Peasant, Pseudo-Citizen,” Urban China 50 (2011), 80-81.
51 In conversation with villagers of Lou Cun in the Bao’an District of Shenzhen.
52 As land in China is owned by the state, The confiscation of land for state use or development is not uncom-
mon. The most famous examples of this are the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze (2003) and the Olympic 
Village in Beijing (2010), both of which displaced millions of residents and razed traditional fabric for the 
implementation of massive government projects.
53 Ma Hang, “‘Villages’ in Shenzhen: Persistence and Transformation of an Old Social System in an Emerging 
Mega City,” PhD diss., Bauhaus-Universität Weimar (2006) 192.
54  The floating population in the rental sector, which includes migrant workers, students, and new entrepre-
neurs to the city, takes up a very large portion of the demographics within urban villages. For example, in 
a study of Houting Village, it is found that of its more than 25 000 inhabitants, only 300 were indigenous to 
the village, making up approximately 1% of the population.
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< Figure 2.3.2 Urban Village
Shenzhen (and much of developed southern China) became landlords, simultaneously being 
subsumed by the capitalist nature of the new city and generating to lines of flight in social land 
appropriation.55
The close ties of kinship made the village an ideal entity for the implementation of collectivized 
industry. Resourceful villages upgraded their traditional power structure to that of a corporation, 
creating jobs and generating income for their residents through the creation of single-product 
light industries. Their success can be attributed to the greater invested interest of the company 
shareholders, in comparison to a conventional corporation made up of members joined only 
by capital.56
However, as Shenzhen became an established municipality, the ViCs became problematic 
in the eyes of the administration. They were effectively self-governed and excluded from 
official planning, and thereby considered an obstruction in the process of thorough modern 
urbanization.57 Clusters of villages were dispersed throughout large cities in southern China, 
creating extreme visual juxtaposition between the envisioned urban future and uncomfortable 
reminders of the past. 
Furthermore, the extrusion of single-storey houses into apartments caused the buildings to be 
too closely clustered. Dubbed ‘handshake buildings’ (where one can, presumably, reach out the 
window to shake hands with a neighbour),58 they have become breeding grounds for unhealthy 
and unsanitary conditions, where lack of light penetration and inadequate infrastructure for 
basic utilities have caused deplorable environmental conditions.59 As a result, laws were put in 
place to dictate the development and expansion of new villages, including minimum distances 
between buildings, creating a strictly gridded urban form adjacent their older counterparts , 
both nestled within the city fabric.60
Nevertheless, urban villages remain one of the most socially vibrant typologies in Shenzhen, 
and continue to be a significant form of habitation for the indigenous residents and a large 
proportion of migrant workers in the city. Innovative transformation of ground floors and street 
spaces into markets, small businesses, and outdoor living rooms effectively negotiate shared 
public spaces. This thesis views the human-scaled architecture as an ideal proportion for social 
appropriation, and socially successful in comparison to the sharply contrasting sterile spaces 
found between buildings in factory-dormitory compounds and gated communities.
The thesis intervention seeks to embody the characteristics of  scale as a framework for the generation of  communal 
living and social dynamism.
Adrian Blackwell and Xu Jian, “New Village = Industrial Village: The Cellular Structure of the Factory 
Territory,” in Urban China: Work in Progress, edited by Brendan McGetrick and Jiang Jun, Hong Kong: Time 
Zone and Urban China, 2009, 52.
Yushi Uehara, “New Village = ViC (Village in the City): Change ViC into the Urban Footprint of China,” 
in Urban China: Work in Progress, edited by Brendan McGetrick and Jiang Jun, Hong Kong: Time Zone and 
Urban China, 2009, 47.
55 Meng Yan, “Urban Villages,” in “New Urban China,” edited by Laurence Liauw, Architectural Design, vol 78 no 
5 (2008), 56-59.
56 Jian Jun and Kuan Xiaoming, “The Taxonomy of Contemporary Chinese Cities (We Make Cities): A Sam-
pling,” in “New Urban China,” edited by Laurence Liauw, Architectural Design vol 78 No 5 (2008), 16-21.
57  “How Did the Second Line Come to Be?”, 2010.
58 O’Donnell, Mary Ann. March 19, 2010. “What Exactly is an Urban Village, Anyway?” Shenzhen Noted. 
http://shenzhennoted.com/2010/03/19/what-exactly-is-an-urban-village-anyway/.
59  Ou Ning and Cao Fei, “San Yuan Li,” posted by Ou Ning, last modified May 6, 2007, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=w7zf9uLKGNA.
60  Zhang, Xueshi and Wang Lechi. “Boom! Shenzhen,” posted by Mary Ann O’Donnell. Last modified 
December 8, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8a5v55RXEuI
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e The danwei (单位, or work unit) was the primary urban labour system utilized during the Maoist 
era. Work units were state-owned compounds physically composed of amenities for work and 
dwelling. They included shops, elementary schools, and recreational facilities to support the 
daily lives of its inhabitants. The danwei also encompassed the state's administrative apparatus 
for social welfare (such as lifetime job security and housing) and public administration (such 
as license for birth or marriage) of its employees.61
Shenzhen’s adoption of the western paradigm of private industries and the capitalist labour 
system was a radical departure from this stable system of employment. The city was built on 
private foreign investment for industrial manufacturing in order to meet global needs. As 
lighter industries offered smaller start-up costs, Shenzhen has become the ideal production 
ground for high-tech corporations.62 On a tabula rasa of social and economic infrastructure, 
Shenzhen integrated itself into the workings of capitalism as efficiently as possible in order 
enter the world market with a competitive edge.
Former agricultural land was appropriated for industry, to become a produdction zone. The 
two most prevalent architectural typologies of the factory and dormitory appeared similar to 
the danwei model, but were stripped of excess amenities to ensure maximum efficiency and 
transience of labour.63
The implementation of private employment was rooted in the unskilled labour of the Chinese 
rural population and the opportunities created by the SEZs and rapid urban development 
caused significant economic disparity between urban and rural areas. As a result, many young 
people in rural areas migrated to urban centres, with temporary work permits and illegally, in 
order to augment the household income of their rural families. Migrant labour in Shenzhen 
can be found primarily in the construction, light-manufacturing, and service industries. Both 
provided minimal accommodations for their workers; the former in temporary barracks, 
and the latter in dormitories situated within factory compounds.64 In both cases, residences 
were made deliberately sparse and often overcrowded to discourage longevity of stay. The 
dormitories were not intended to be comfortable dwelling places, but simply a pragmatic 
component in the process of capitalist production. The instability and disposability of labour 
discouraged the formation of unions or negotiation for workers’ rights, thereby perpetuating 
the systematic exploitation of rural workers in the city.65
Furthermore, workers with (and without) temporary work permits maintained their rural status 
in the hukou system. As such, they (and their descendents) were not eligible for urban public 
healthcare, education, or right to housing in the city. Combined with their general lack of 
education and training, job prospects for migrants were confined to the lowest segment of 
urban employment.66 Although the state had administratively allowed for rural migrants to 
61 Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “Social and Spatial Implications of Housing Reform in China,” International 
Journal of  Urban and Regional Research 24.2 (June 2000): 402, 409.
62 Mike Daisey, “Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory,” This American Life,  http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/454/mr-daisey-and-the-apple-factory.
63  Pun Ngai, Made in China: Factory Workers in a Global Workplace, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005, 5-6.
64  Ibid, (80-)83.
65  Ibid, 5-6.
66  C Cindy Fan, “Migration and Labour-Market Returns in Urban China: Results from a Recent Survey in 
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^ Figure 2.3.3 Factory-Dormitory Compound: Isometric Drawing
   Figure 2.3.4 (Overleaf) Factory-Dormitory Compound
form the sub-structure of the economy of the city, they made no provisions for dwelling. The 
assimilation of migrants into the social welfare system are beginning to be addressed in the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), and includes the implementation of compulsory education 
for the children of migrants up until high school (as is the case for urban dwellers).67
Long-term migrants with families have integrated into the private rental sector found in urban 
villages. Although the practice displays a creative reciprocal leveraging of economic and social 
situations at hand, rural migrants remain powerless in the monopoly over land and economy 
in the city of Shenzhen.68
Legislation in 1999 allowed migrants to purchase housing in large city cores at market price 
(thereby gaining urban hukou). Unfortunately, the segmentation of the labour market and low 
wages did not allow for its actual implementation.69
Although migrant workers are arguably in most dire need for social housing, they are excluded from qualification 
by their rural status. In response to the social disparity enacted toward the floating population, the thesis proposal 
administratively targets this disenfranchised demographic in the provision of  social housing within the city, 
requiring work permits rather than urban hukou for distribution. 
Guangzhou,” Environment and Planning A33 (2001), 484-486.
67  “Full Translation of the 12th Five-Year Plan,” Accessed June 2, 2013, http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/
upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf.
68  Meng Yan, “Urban Villages,” in “New Urban China,” edited by Liauw, Laurence, Architectural Design, vol 78 
no 5 (2008), 56-59.
69  Wang and Murie, 2000, 406.
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< Figure 2.3.5 Newly Developed Gated Community: Isometric Drawing and Photograph
   Figure 2.3.6 (Overleaf) Shenzhen Central Business District
The 暴发户 (bao fa hu, literally, the explosive rich) of Shenzhen has taken full advantage of 
the suddenly liberal market in China for the accumulation of capital. The new generation of 
nouveau riche showcases the overwhelming success of Deng’s reforms, while glittering new 
developments exemplify the glorious economic future of the state.
Population and capital growth rates radically exceeded the most optimistic of projections by the 
central government.70 The colloquial term “Shenzhen speed” described the velocity at which 
skyscrapers were erected in the city, which firmly established the city’s position in leading the 
nation to a new age of prosperous modernity.71
The formally planned development in Shenzhen often took the form of vast government 
buildings that exuberated monumentality, Central Business Districts (CBD) that mimic 
the western model for capitalist urban design, and gated communities that isolate the 
economically and socially elite above the city from the working class. These developments 
grow planimetrically in concentrated clusters alongside urban villages and factory compounds, 
making the urbanscape of Shenzhen a collage of single-typology archipelagos.72
A self-fulfilling prophecy of Deng’s ‘cultural desert’,73 the high-rise condo towers in Shenzhen 
are culturally foreign to its specific geography, and have more in common with the ubiquitous 
practice of global capitalism. They are valourized as a symbol of status for the occupant, 
while the agglomeration of urban form hails the economic success of the state. They enact a 
deliberate erasure and separation from traditional cultural practices and technologies, setting 
distance against the perceived backwardness of the recent past.74
In a city as new as Shenzhen, purchasing property at market price (as well as graduation from 
Shenzhen University) gives the property owner local Shenzhen hukou. The census in August 
of 2012 states that of an estimated 15.1 million residents of Shenzhen, only 1-2 million hold 
local urban hukou.75 The great disparity in numbers of official and unofficial residents speaks 
to the very small percentage of privileged class above the vast majority of the middle and 
lower classes that make up the under-structure of Shenzhen’s economy and labour force. The 
state’s representation of Shenzhen as an economic success serves to highlight the extreme high-
income segment of the population, whereas in fact the reform has only further exacerbated 
economic disparity within the city.
Although the thesis intervention has no illusions to halt the perpetuation of  capitalism and economic disparity, the 
proposal physically interacts with gated communities in an effort toward empathetic integration of  the fragmented 
social classes of  the city.
70  Kwan Yiu Wong, ed,. Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China’s Experiment in Modernization, Hong 
Kong: Tai Dao Publishing Co., 1982, 25-83.
71  Record-breaking construction rates of “one floor in three days” (Shenzhen International Trade Centre, 
1980s) to “one floor in two days” (Kingkey Financial Center Plaza, or KK 100 Plaza, 2010) 
Mary Ann O’Donnell, April 27, 2013, “On Shenzhen Speed,” Shenzhen Noted. http://shenzhennoted.
com/2013/04/27/on-shenzhen-speed/;
Sun,Yuchen. “New SZ Speed Set.” Shenzhen Daily. September 3, 2010. http://szdaily.sznews.com/html/2010-
09/03/content_1219261.htm#.
72  Craciun, 2001, 126-131.
73  Ibid, 111-113.
74  Lin, 2001, 175.
75 Mary Ann O’Donnell, September 10, 2011, “Population and Hukou Update, 2012,” Shenzhen Noted, http://
shenzhennoted.com/2012/07/05/population-and-hukou-update-2012/.
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< Figure 2.4.1 Factory-Dormitory Compound in Bao’an District
The economic reforms of 1978 did not only have macro impacts on the physical urbanization 
and development of China, but also significantly altered the relationship between the state, 
danwei , and housing.
Between the revolution of 1949 and the death of Mao in 1976, China operated as a State-
Planned Economy76. The state owned all work units (public enterprises) and land, while private 
property ownership was criticized as a ‘capitalist tendency’.77 Housing was incorporated into 
public social welfare and taken into consideration in determining workers’ wages.78 During 
this period, all financial distribution and allocation for housing was solely managed by the 
central government, while municipalities and work units served as administrators to the public 
at large. A portion of the national budget was allocated to each danwei for the organization, 
construction, and distribution of housing to its employees at a negligible rental rate (at 2-3% of 
household income between 1949 to 1990).79 The lack of financial pressure on individuals for 
the provision of housing allowed the state to keep wages low and control consumption in urban 
areas.80 However, the strong emphasis placed on production (over consumption) during Maoist 
reform often caused funds for the development and maintenance of housing to be diverted to 
other state objectives. Exacerbated by the rapid urbanization movement, a large discrepancy 
grew between housing demand and supply, thereby causing a perpetual shortage of housing.81 
In the state-distribution system, the allocation of housing was determined by the status or 
seniority of the head of the household rather than pragmatic spatial and economic needs 
of the inhabitants, such as family size or income. As high-ranking officials determined the 
allocation of housing, imbalances in power and conflicts of interest led to public complaint 
against corruption and unfair distribution.82
Each danwei was an enclave that held the workplace and dwellings for its employees, and 
amenities to support daily life. Although there were discrepancies in the size and type of 
units allocated to individuals of various social rank, there nevertheless existed a balanced 
mix of incomes and demographics within each compound. The close proximity of work and 
habitation further alleviated congestion and commute expenses in the city.83
Deng’s economic reform policies sought to transition the nation into the Planned Commodity 
Economy, and the distribution of housing from the welfare system to a productive market 
that would actively contribute to national economic growth. Funds were given to municipal 
governments and work units to implement residential developments, effectively decentralizing 
economic responsibility for housing. The eventual goal of the policies was to encourage private 
home ownership by individuals in a comprehensive private housing market. An initial test 
performed in select cities for individuals to purchase private-sector dwelling units at construction 
76 The three stages of economic development practiced in the People’s Republic of China since its inaugura-
tion: the State-Planned Economy (1949-1978), the Planned Commodity Economy (1985-1991), and the 
Socialist Market Economy (1992-2000).
The latter two systems sought to move progressively towards a comprehensive market economy (with Chi-
nese characteristics), but were often prevented from doing so by the persisting socialist political structure.
 Lü Junhua, Peter G. Rowe and Zhang Jie, Modern Urban Housing in China, 1840-2000, Munich: Prestel, 2001; 
and Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “The Process of Commercialisation of Urban Housing in China,’ Urban 
Studies 33:971 (1996).
77 Wang and Murie, 1996, 971.
78 Wang and Murie, 2000, 397.
79 Wang and Murie, 1996, 973.
80 Wang and Murie, 2000, 402.
81  Wang and Murie, 1996, 971.
82  Ibid.
83  Wang and Murie, 2000, 402.
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cost came up with poor results. Key reasons identified with the failure of the experiment lay in the 
inability of civil servants to purchase housing with their controlled wages, and the low rental price of 
public housing further discouraged existing tenants from purchasing property.84
The unsuccessful trials led to reforms of the wage and rental systems. As China moved into the 
Planned Commodity Economy, the next set of policies focused on raising rents in public sector 
housing to cover basic costs, including the acquisition of property, construction, and maintenance. 
The extra rental funds collected by the municipality and work units would then be re-invested in 
subsidies towards the purchase of property in an effort to create a financial balance between rental 
and purchasing markets. To help employees with the additional cost of housing, a portion of their 
wages (adjusted at <25 %) was issued in housing-subsidy tickets that could only be put towards housing 
consumption. The eventual goal was to phase out purchase subsidies by public bodies through the 
gradual increase of wages, thereby severing ties between employment and housing. Property bought 
with subsidies up to this point gave the owners use rights to inhabit and pass on through inheritance, but 
not property rights to resell on the free market.85
With the introduction of the Socialist Market Economy in 1992, the Housing Provident Fund was 
implemented to simultaneously deepen the reform and to alleviate financial burden for housing to 
individual households. The initiative allowed work units to put aside a set percentage of wages (adjusted 
at around 5%) to a savings account towards the purchase of housing with mortgage and subsidies 
from the state.86 In 1994, three tiers of property costs were introduced based on household income. 
High-income families would purchase property at market price; the middle and low-income households 
paid a basic price, which includes the costs of property acquisition, construction, and management; for 
households who could not afford the basic price, a standard price would be applied as a transitional 
mechanism. 87 Housing purchased with subsidy (the latter two categories) could not be re-sold on the 
free market. They would either be resold to the original seller (a public entity), or upon approval, 
return to the seller a portion of profits from the sale.88 
Despite the optimistic projections of the housing reform, the high-income sector of the population 
remained a small minority. As developers sought to provide the highest-profit making sector of 
the industry, the construction industries focused on housing demand rather than need.89 There still 
remained a large portion of the population in the middle to low-income classes without adequate 
provision.
Spatially, market demand inflated land prices within urban centres. As private enterprises replaced 
work units, public residential compounds were dismantled to build high-density enclaves for the 
economic elite. Although units in new developments were offered to original tenants of the site for a 
subsidized price, civil servants with controlled wages seldom had the means to afford a luxury home. 
As a result, most old neighbourhoods were dispersed and relocated to the urban periphery, thus 
exacerbating the spatial separation of social classes in the city. The new system of housing distribution 
independent of workplace contributed to urban congestion and commute costs.90
While housing reform was beneficial to high-income civil servants, other demographics were put at 
a distinct disadvantage. Young, educated people who had previously been provided free housing by 
84 Wang and Murie 1996, 974, 976.
85 Ibid, 975-976, 978.
86 Richard J. Buttimer Jr, Anthony Yanxiang Gu, and Tyler T. Yang, “The Chinese Housing Provident Fund,” Inter-
national Real Estate Review 7.1 (2004):1, http://www.umac.mo/fba/irer/papers/past/Vol7_pdf/1-30.pdf;
Lü Junhua, Peter G. Rowe and Zhang Jie, Modern Urban Housing in China, 1840-2000, Munich: Prestel, 2001, 257-258.
87 Wang and Murie, 1996, 982-983.
88 Wang and Murie 2000, 404.
89 Anirban Mostafa, Francis K. W. Wong, and Eddie C. M. Hui, “A Study on Housing Provision System towards Hous-
ing Affordability in Shanghai,” Shanghai Star, June 5, 1998, 1.
90 Wang and Murie, 2000, 410-414.
89
Th
o
u
G
h
TS o
n d
w
ellin
G
their work units now struggle to purchase houses in city centres. The Provident Fund favours 
seniority by virtue of accumulation over time, and young professionals often necessarily find 
housing the private rental sector. Severe overcrowding often occurs due to a lack of monetary 
means, leading to their collective colloquial name “Ant Group 2.0”.91
In recognition of urban housing shortages in the low-income segment of the population, the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) has put forward ambitious objectives for the construction 
of social housing. The initiative calls for ten million new units to be built in China in 2011, 240 
000 of which would be located in Shenzhen.92 
There are currently two tiers of social housing in China. The anju (安居, or 'peaceful living') 
social housing programme was introduced in most large cities in 1994. Anju is implemented 
in tandem with the private construction sector. The government allows for financial tax and 
permit incentives on the developers’ acquisition and maintenance of property. In return, the 
resulting units are sold at a subsidized price as stipulated by the state. An additional tier of 
standard social housing for the lowest-income households was introduced in 1999. This type of 
housing often involved the re-appropriation of former public housing developments. As these 
were considered a transitional space of dwelling, and did not necessarily contribute to the 
privatization of state-independent home ownership, the inhabitants of this tier were required to 
maintain household income below a specific benchmark.93
The base requirement for qualification for social housing and subsidies included local urban 
hukou, permanent employment in the public sector, and proof of income. The household 
registration system continues to exclude a large segment of the population from state welfare, 
and the floating population is not eligible to make use of advantages offered by the state. 
Urban hukou holders in Shenzhen make up less than 15% of the total population.94 As the city 
is made up of mostly private industries independent from the state, the new employers were 
free from any financial obligation to house their employees in anything more habitable than a 
dormitory. 95
Shenzhen represents a particularly aggravated case of housing inequality, beginning in the 
steep variation of land prices within and without the SEZ and further exacerbated by sharp 
disparities in socio-economic demographics. As a city with a sparse indigenous population, the 
hukou, originally a socialist apparatus of control, has today produced economic polarization. 
In a city of workers, the ability to purchase housing has become synonymous with the right of 
dwelling. While housing reforms sought to break ties between housing and workplace, they 
only served to re-bind the process to the flow of capital.
The thesis proposal acknowledges the capitalistic tendencies of  the development of  Shenzhen, but takes a 
stand against discriminatory practices enacted by the hukou. Adhering to existing practices of  social housing, 
the intervention seeks to recognize the unacknowledged demographic of  the floating population in the public 
distribution of  dwelling, as an architectural effort toward their social and urban acceptance and integration.
91  “The Ant Group, Version 2.0 (蚁族 2.0),” in Urban Congestion: the Logic Behind the Chaos, Urban China  56 
(December 2012) 50-55.
92 Du Juan “2011 Shenzhen & Hong Kong Bi-City Biennale of Urbanism \ Architecture (2011深圳 & 香港城
市 \ 建筑双城双年展: 10 Million Units: Housing an Affordable City (广厦千万 居者之城)." Architectural 
Journal (建筑学报) 3 (2012): 110-114.
“Full Translation of the 12th Five-Year Plan,” Accessed June 2, 2013, http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/
upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf.
93 Lü Junhua, Peter G. Rowe and Zhang Jie, Modern Urban Housing in China, 1840-2000, Munich: Prestel, 2001, 
264-266.
94 O’Donnell, Mary Ann. September 10, 2011. “Population and Hukou Update, 2012.” Shenzhen Noted. http://
shenzhennoted.com/2012/07/05/population-and-hukou-update-2012/.
95 Wang and Murie , 2000,  402, 406.
Wang and Murie , 1996, 985.
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In order to better understand the Lines of Division at work at an urbanistic and 
architectural scale, the area around Buji Checkpoint has been chosen for a closer 
study.
Buji has historically been the site of transportation in the area. It was the railway 
stop, connecting the region to Hong Kong to the south, and Guangdong province 
to the north. It has since been supplemented by the Shengui highway (connecting 
Shenzhen to Guizhou), Caopu metro stop, and Buji checkpoint. A series of wholesale 
markets for agricultural equipment and livestock have taken advantage of the hub 
and located themselves alongside the highway.1
The molar division of the Second Line is virtual today - it has been developed over 
by gated communities to the west side of the highway, and an urban village has 
extended itself over the Line to the east.
Like most villages, its geographic location would not have been taken into account 
when the Second Line was drawn on a map in Beijing, and as such, it is unclear where 
the actual boundary of division is. The south half of the village appears less organized 
in plan, and would have been constructed based on the original configurations of 
the houses, taking into account a mixture of geographic topography, feng shui, and 
social proximities. The north half of the village would have been land given to the 
village through negotiations with the state. The new village is planned with a regular 
grid, and likely followed by-laws governing the distances between buildings. 
Flower Arrangement Villages that transverse the Second Line may have had a hand 
in smuggling workers across the border (for a fee) during the reign of the Second 
Line. This service may well serve as the main occupation or industry of the village. 
This is a particular problem in the view of the official administration, and is often 
cause for movements for razing urban villages.2 One argument presented in this 
particular case is the lack of structural integrity of the self-built apartment buildings 
due to the steepness of the terrain on the site.
1  Kwan Yiu Wong, editor, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China’s Experiment in Modernization (Hong 
Kong: Tai Dao Publishing Co., 1982).
2  Huang Weiwen, “Story of the Borderline (说界)," Urban China 24 (2007).
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A In mapping the social infrastructure of the area, 
a walking radius of 500 meters (approximately 5 
minutes) is determined as the service area. The 
radius then re-adjusted based on adjacency of 
institutions. For example, subway stations cover 
larger areas than bus stops, hospitals cover 
larger areas than clinics, secondary schools 
cover larger areas than elementary schools or 
kindergartens, and so on.
> Figure 2.5.3 Proximity of  Social Infrastructure and Service Area
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This set of drawings fine-tunes the previous circle 
diagrams by accounting for social structures 
within the city. 
Thicker lines indicate larger institutions that cover 
greater areas of service, such as metro station vs. 
bus stop, or hospital vs. cliinic. 
These areas of use may either follow or transgress 
the molecular territories of division. For example, 
many gated communities contain elementary 
schools that are likely used only by the members 
of that specific community, while amenities such 
as bus stops and hospitals are shared by residents 
of different social classes. Social infrastructure 
may both reinforce and subvert the micro lines 
of division.
In this case, a division-reinforcing institution 
is one where the dotted lines of its user group 
follows the boundaries of micro territories below, 
while a division-subverting institution is one 
where the dotted lines cross the boundaries of 
micro territories of division. The latter creates 
spaces of overlap between demographics; the 
potentialities for unexpected interaction are lines 
of flight that are advocated in this thesis.
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The Second Line has made Shenzhen a place of contradiction. While the city exemplifies the miracle 
of the modern Chinese economy, it also illustrates the destructive impacts of reckless development 
on socio-economic disparity. The architectural intervention takes the form of a linear infrastructure 
physically situated on former site of the now virtual political boundary. 
The thesis proposal seeks to embody three principles:
MeMorIalIzatIon - The thesis recognizes the significance of the Second Line in urban and economic 
reform and the development of the City of Shenzhen, and subsequently the state of China. As such, 
the proposal physically re-constructs the space of the now virtual Second Line as a monument to the 
success of Deng’s Special Economic Zone and the modern Chinese economy. 
Furthermore, the line was the inaugurating apparatus of drawing migration into the otherwise 
agricultural milieu of Shenzhen, which resulted in the physical and economic construction of 
Shenzhen. The project seeks to valorize the mobility inherent in its creation and function, and creates 
a monument to migration.
SubverSIon - At grade, the intervention acts as an open public infrastructure that provides potential 
spaces of interface for the surrounding self-contained communities. A variety of communal, educational, 
recreational, transportation and commercial programmes respond to the immediate context and 
adjacent typologies to encourage appropriation, creating a framework for interaction among otherwise 
segregated demographics. The project acts as a social condenser that seeks to create common, civic 
spaces of gathering to subvert the dominating ideology of the divisive apparatus. Amenities inherent 
within each compound are leveraged for communal use and benefit in an architectural attempt to 
overcome social stigma and segregation through inhabitation of the Second Line. 
DwellIng - Of the three main demographic groups in Shenzhen, the migrant population alone are 
without hold on land or capital. While migration policies allow for their participation in the physical 
construction of the city, there are no provisions for their settlement due to their lack of access to 
education, healthcare, and housing. The proposal finds a niche in the current state’s initiatives to 
integrate the floating population into the city1 through the introduction of a social housing project 
for migrants in the floors above the social infrastructure at grade. It intends to contribute to the 
existing state objectives for social housing, 2 but takes a stand against the discriminatory practices of its 
distribution. It will be publicly administered akin to the lower tiers of current social housing policies, 
but requiring working permits, including temporary ones, rather than urban hukou for qualification. 
Space will be allocated on a square footage basis, at a fraction of market price as pre-determined 
by the state. Tenants will purchase and build units within the structure, but will be required to 
sell the space back to the city at the end of their tenure at the current purchase price as set by the 
governing body. In this manner, units within the structure remain affordable for subsequent tenants. 
The architectural presence of the intervention seeks to accelerate the process of social reform and 
overcome urban-rural stigmatization through visibility and integration.
The first part of the design section introduces a series of strategies in the implementation of the project 
in terms of base structure, response to site, and potential unit configuration and appropriation. The 
tenant-finished strategy of units seeks to build a sense of culture by building within the mosaic of 
Chinese cultural backgrounds found in the City of Shenzhen.
The second portion of the chapter applies the systems to in situ sectional samples of the proposal at 
Buji Checkpoint.
1  “Full Translation of the 12th Five-Year Plan.” Accessed June 2, 2013. http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/upload/
fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf.
2  Du, Juan. “2011 Shenzhen & Hong Kong Bi-City Biennale of Urbanism \ Architecture (2011深圳 & 香港城市 \ 
建筑双城双年展: 10 Million Units: Housing an Affordable City (广厦千万 居者之城)." Architectural Journal (建筑学报) 3 
(2012): 110 - 114.
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Figure 3.1.2 Base Development
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Situated at the natural access corridors within the village, the intervention 
adds onto existing retail activity at grade, creates open street walls, and 
intensifies social dynamics on site.
The situation leverages the social dynamism of the ViC and green 
environment surrounding the factory compound for shared ameni-
ties between the neighbouring demographics.
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exIStIng Street
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Figure 3.1.3 Context Development
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Situated on the greenbelts that buffer industrial parks from the road, the intervention 
creates a street front with added sidewalks for pedestrian access. Underdeveloped 
areas between the proposed structure and existing building become parks and 
recreational spaces.
The density of new developments do not allow for the addition of new 
built form without compromising light conditions at grade. The interven-
tion is an open, covered structure to create a walkway, and where space 
allows, a parallel linear park.
The intervention mirrors the commercial and social activity of the ViC adjacent 
the gated community, bringing vitality and into the latter. In turn, the interven-
tion draws the nouveau riche into the retail space of the village and provides 
a source of income for the businesses of the village.
Open park space provided by the greenbelts of factory compounds al-
lows for the extension of use by the residents of the gated communities. 
Proximity in the sharing of space eases the effects of class discrimination 
and encourages the generation of social empathy and acceptance.
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Figure 3.1.4 Unit Development
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In practicing architecture in a (Chinese) capitalist economy, one may take on one of  the following 
attitudes:
1. To engage unconditionally in the system of  production and consumption.
2. To refuse participation in defiance.
3. To participate critically, situating oneself  between the first two attitudes.
The first attitude enters the market without questioning or scrutinizing its validity. It doubts and 
denies research, resulting in the doubt and denial of  architectural meaning, the denial of  architecture.
The second attitude may arise of  a traditional Chinese or Marxist ideology. It chooses education, 
chooses research, often leading to an engagement with immaterial architecture. In practice, the refusal 
to participate often gives way to selective participation, often limited in scope, speed, and selection 
of  commission.
The third attitude does not deny capitalism; does not believe in an inherent discrepancy between the 
free market and architecture. One perseveres in the process and method of  architecture in the field of  
capitalism, perseveres in research. It is this third attitude in which we choose to operate.
- Yung Ho Chang of  Atelier FCJZ1
1  Translated from the Chinese in: Yung Ho Chang, 建筑动词 Jian Zhu Dong Ci: Yung Ho 
Chang / Atelier FCJZ, contributors Lars Lerup, Ruan Xing, Hou Hanru, and Zhou Rong, 
Taipei: Tian Yuan Cheng Shi Wen Hua She Ye Ltd., 2006, 4-5.
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This thesis embraces an inherent self-contradiction. While the Second Line is 
recognized as a crucial apparatus to radically pull China out of economic destitution, 
it perpetuates social disparity and physically fragments the construction and function 
of the new city. 
The thesis proposal conceptually and formally asserts a linear monumentality, but 
the dissolution of the structure at grade encourages social interaction and allows the 
project to exceed its linearity through the experience of occupation. The potential 
connectivity of otherwise segregated communities across the physical body of the 
intervention further disintegrates the divisive ideology of the Second Line , and 
creates a complex web across the structure from emergent lines of flight.  
In an ever-changing political climate of continual reform, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict the future of China’s demographic and economic evolution. 
The unprecedented speed and extent of growth does not follow a pre-chartered line of 
course, but rather compresses time and undergoes several revolutions simultaneously. 
The precarious relationship between the state, the growth of the economy, and the 
middle class need to be continually addressed and negotiated. 
The skeletal composition of the proposal deliberately encourages re-appropriation, 
allowing the project to evolve with the city, its policies, and its population. Although 
the structure itself is static, its programming takes on the transformational quality 
of Shenzhen, continually progressing through cycles of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization through time.
While the Second Line exemplifies a particularly exacerbated scenario of division, 
similar struggles exist throughout the rest of developing China, if not the world. The 
conflict between the projected image of economic success built on a substructure of 
disparity has often been taken for granted as an inherent stage of economic revolution 
and growth.
In 2012, of the 15.1 million inhabitants of Shenzhen, only 1-2 million hold local hukou2. 
The city is physically and economically constructed by the hands of the migrant 
population, yet existing state policies continually suppress their legibility as the 
dominant demographic in the city. Through the social housing scheme intended for 
this disenfranchised demographic, the project is not only a tribute to the politic and 
economic creation of the city, but is simultaneously a monument to migration.
The thesis project treads the boundary between an ideological manifesto and 
possible architectural proposal. It attempts to carve a niche for the disenfranchised 
demographic within the existing framework of state policies and objectives, while 
taking an unmistakable position against the current labour provision practices. As 
China moves into the future, architectural and urban proposals will necessarily 
be continually re-considered and re-evaluated in conjunction with new social and 
political realities, walking a fine line between the first two of attitudes above, and 
seeking creative, emergent lines of flight in leveraging the forces of the economy and 
collective social empathy.
2  O’Donnell, Mary Ann. September 10, 2011. “Population and Hukou Update, 2012.” Shenzhen 
Noted. http://shenzhennoted.com/2012/07/05/population-and-hukou-update-2012/.
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